Abstract -In the database outsourcing paradigm, a data owner (DO) delegates its DBMS administration to a specialized service provider (SP) that receives and processes queries from clients. The traditional outsourcing model (TOM) requires that the DO and the SP maintain authenticated data structures to enable authentication of query results. In this paper, we present SAE, a novel outsourcing model that separates authentication from query execution. Specifically, the DO does not perform any task except for maintaining its dataset (if there are updates). The SP only stores the DO's dataset and computes the query results using a conventional DBMS. All security-related tasks are outsourced to a separate trusted entity (TE), which maintains limited authentication information about the original dataset. A client contacts the TE when it wishes to establish the correctness of a result returned by the SP. The TE efficiently generates a verification token of negligible size. The client can verify the token with minimal cost. SAE eliminates the participation of the DO and the SP in the authentication process, and outperforms TOM in every aspect, including processing cost for all parties involved, communication overhead, query response time and ease of implementation in practical applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Instead of administrating their data locally, several organizations outsource DBMS management to third-party service providers that receive and process queries from clients. The providers are not necessarily trustworthy and, thus, they should be able to prove that the results are sound (i.e., unaltered and containing no bogus data) and complete (i.e., all records satisfying the query are present). We refer to a sound and complete query result as correct. Figure 1 illustrates the traditional outsourcing model (TOM). The data owner (DO) builds an authenticated data structure (ADS) over its dataset. The ADS is a conventional index, augmented with hash values or signatures generated with a public-key cryptosystem (e.g., RSA). The DO transmits its dataset and signatures to the service provider (SP), which constructs the ADS locally and utilizes it to compute the result of each incoming query, as well as a verification object (VO). The VO contains authentication data (i.e., hashes/signatures) for proving the correctness of the query result. In case of updates, the DO generates new signatures, modifies its ADS, and notifies the SP that updates its ADS accordingly.
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Fig. 1 The traditional database outsourcing model
Several ADS have been proposed for range query authentication [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11] . The current state-ofthe-art for disk-based datasets is the MB-Tree [5] , which combines the concepts of the B + -Tree and the Merkle Hash Tree [7] . A leaf node entry in the MB-tree is associated with a digest computed on the binary representation of the corresponding record, using a one-way, collision-resistant hash function. An intermediate node entry is associated with a digest computed on the concatenation of the digests in the page it points to. The DO signs the digest h root associated with the root. The DO and the SP maintain identical copies of the MB-tree and the signature. Assume a 1D range query q corresponding to the result RS = {r i , r i+1,…, r j }. In addition to RS, the SP returns to the client a VO that contains: (i) the two boundary records r i-1 , r j+1 that enclose RS, (ii) the digests of all left siblings of every visited entry in the path from the root to r i-1 , (iii) the digests of all right siblings of every visited entry in the path from the root to r j+1 , and (iv) the DO's signature. The client can re-construct h root from RS and the digests in the VO, and match it against the signature. Soundness is established by hash collision resistance. Completeness is guaranteed through the presence of the two boundary records.
TOM suffers from several drawbacks: (i) the DO is actively involved in the framework, since it has to build and maintain an ADS locally, thus, defeating the purpose of outsourcing; (ii) the SP must modify its DBMS in order to embed ADS functionality; (iii) the VO is typically large, imposing substantial communication overhead; (iv) the ADS exhibits inferior performance with respect to a conventional index. Motivated by these shortcomings, we propose SAE, a novel outsourcing model that offers a wide range of benefits. SAE separates authentication from query execution by exploiting trustworthy organizations with expertise on security issues. We henceforth refer to such an organization as a trusted entity (TE). Although a TE possesses up-to-date resources and know-how on security standards, cryptographic libraries, etc., it does not necessarily have the infrastructure to manage large databases and high query loads. Therefore, SAE assigns to the TE only the authentication process, which involves little computational effort compared to the actual query processing performed at the SP. Next, we present the main concepts of SAE, focusing on 1D range queries. Figure 2 outlines the basic functionality of SAE. The DO transmits a relational 
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We denote the set of tuples t generated from the records in R as T.
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Fig. 2 The entities and their interaction in SAE
Clients issue queries directly to the SP, which sends back only the results. Let q be a range query on attribute a. RS = {r i , r i+1 , …, r j } ⊆ R signifies the actual result, and |RS| its cardinality. Continuing the above example, q could be "select all cameras from R whose price is between 200 and 300 euros". Assume that after processing q, the SP returns a set RS SP to the client, which may be different from the correct result RS, if the SP is malicious. In order to verify RS SP , the client sends q to the TE 1 . Let S ⊕ be the exclusive-OR (XOR) of the digests of tuples in a set S. Upon receiving q, the TE first determines set TS = {t i , t i+1 , …, t j } ⊆ T, whose tuples correspond to the records of RS. It then produces a verification token VT = TS ⊕ = t i .h ⊕ t i+1 .h ⊕ … ⊕ t j .h = RS ⊕ , which captures authentication information about RS. VT consumes just a few bytes (i.e., the size of a digest) independently of the result size and, as we show in Section III, it can be computed very efficiently by utilizing auxiliary structures. The TE finally transmits the VT to the client.
The client computes RS SP ⊕ (i.e., the XOR of the digests of the records in RS SP ) locally, and matches it against the VT. Assume that a malicious SP returns to the client a corrupt result RS SP = (RS-DS) ∪ IS, where DS (⊆ RS) is a subset of the actual results and IS is a set of fake tuples. By removing DS from RS, the SP attacks the result completeness, whereas by injecting IS it attacks soundness. Note that modifying a tuple r ∈ RS to r' is equivalent to including r into DS, and r' into IS. The SP can escape detection, if and only if the VT produced for RS (i.e., RS ⊕ ) is equal to RS SP ⊕ . This happens if and only if:
, we prove that it is computationally infeasible for the SP to find sets of records DS and IS such that DS ⊕ = IS ⊕ ; therefore, SAE is secure. Furthermore, compared to TOM, SAE has numerous advantages including the following:
• The DO has a minimal participation, as it simply transmits its dataset (and updates, if any) to the SP and the TE, without having to compute authentication information and maintain a sophisticated ADS locally.
• The SP does not need specialized infrastructure. Since there is no overhead of authentication information, query processing is as fast as in conventional database systems.
• The transmission overhead is very small, because the size of the VT is negligible compared to that of typical VOs. Furthermore, the client can only verify the queries of its choice, whereas in TOM the authentication overhead occurs for all queries.
III. XB-TREE Recall that the TE maintains a set T of tuples t i = <t i .id, t i .a, t i .h>, each corresponding to a record r i ∈ R. In order to compute the VT for a query q, the TE could perform a sequential scan of T and retrieve the digests of all records qualifying q. Although the size of t i is usually much smaller than that of r i , this scan can be expensive contradicting the goal of SAE, which requires that the effort of the TE should be minimal compared to that of the SP. To produce the VT for a query q: [ql, qu] , where ql (qu) is q's lower (upper) bound, the TE executes algorithm GenerateVT of Figure 4 . The procedure is recursive and takes as initial arguments: q, the root node N of the XB-Tree, and bitstring VT=0. Note that VT is passed by reference. Let f be the number of entries in N. For simplicity, in the pseudo-code we assume that e 0 .sk = -∞ (although the XB-Tree does not store e 0 .sk), and that there is a fictitious entry e f (also not existing in the tree) with e f .sk = +∞. The loop in lines 1-7 scans the f entries of N, and distinguishes two cases in which it updates VT: (i) If ql is less than or equal to e i .sk, and qu is greater than or equal to e i+1 .sk, then all the tuples in e i .L as well as in the subtree rooted at e i .c are present in the result. Therefore, GenerateVT XORes e i .X to VT (lines 2-3). (ii) If e i .sk is enclosed in q (but not the subtree pointed by e i .c), the algorithm sets VT to VT ⊕ e i .L ⊕ (lines 4-5). Lines 6-8 simply ensure that the procedure recursively visits the nodes at deeper levels of the XB-Tree.
If (q.ql ≤ ei.sk) and (q.qu ≥ ei+1.sk)
Else if (q.ql ≤ ei.sk) and (q.qu ≥ ei.sk))
If ((q.ql > ei.sk) and (q.ql < ei+1.sk)) or 7.
((q.qu > ei.sk) and (q.qu < ei+1.sk)) 8.
If (ei.c ≠ null), GenerateVT(q, ei.c, VT) We demonstrate GenerateVT with the example of Figure 3 , for query q: [5, 17] . Upon the first procedure call, VT = 0 and N = N 1 . Since no search key in N 1 or subtree rooted at an N 1 's entry is enclosed in q, the algorithm does not update VT, and recursively continues in N 2 . Because both e 4 .sk = 6 and e 5 .sk = 13 lie in q, GenerateVT first computes VT = VT ⊕ e 4 .X = 0 ⊕ e 4 .L ⊕ ⊕ e 11 .X ⊕ e 12 .X = t 4 .h ⊕ t 5 .h ⊕ t 6 .h (lines 2-3 in Figure 4 ) since, except for the records in e 4 .L, the tuples in the subtree rooted at e 4 .c (i.e., node N 5 ) are contained in q as well . The algorithm next calculates VT = VT ⊕ e 5 .L ⊕ = (t 4 .h ⊕ t 5 .h ⊕ t 6 .h) ⊕ t 7 .h (lines [4] [5] , in order to include the digests of the tuples with search key 13 in VT. Subsequently, the procedure visits N 4 and N 6 . Since ql > e 10 .sk = 3, GenerateVT does not perform any action in N 4 . On the other hand, in N 6 , it first updates VT to VT ⊕ e 13 .X = VT ⊕ 0 = t 4 .h ⊕ t 5 .h ⊕ t 6 .h ⊕ t 7 .h (lines 2-3), and then evaluates VT = VT ⊕ e 14 .L ⊕ = (t 4 .h ⊕ t 5 .h ⊕ t 6 .h ⊕ t 7 .h) ⊕ t 8 .h (lines 4-5), because e 14 .sk = 15 satisfies q. The algorithm then terminates. Observe that the final VT, i.e., t 4 .h ⊕ t 5 .h ⊕ t 6 .h ⊕ t 7 .h ⊕ t 8 .h, is the desired one, as it represents the XOR of the digests of the tuples in q's actual result.
GenerateVT visits O(log fXB K) nodes independently of the query result size, where K is the number of tree nodes and f XB is the maximum fanout of the XB-Tree (some traversals may not reach the leaf level). Furthermore, the XB-Tree supports fast insertion and deletion operations in O( log fXB K) time, utilizing the standard insertion and deletion algorithms of the traditional B-Tree, subject to some modifications concerning the proper updating of the X values. Since the TE maintains only two attributes (search key, id) and a digest for each record, the size of T is small compared to the original dataset R, especially if R contains numerous or large (e.g., text, images) attributes.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We compare SAE with TOM using an Intel Core Duo 2GHz, with 2GB of RAM. All cryptographic components are implemented with the Crypto++ library [1] . A digest consumes 20 bytes for both SAE and TOM. Each record contains a search key (i.e., a value on the range query attribute) and additional attributes. The search keys are integers (4 bytes) in the domain [0, 10 7 ]. The total record size is set to 500 bytes. We use two datasets: (i) UNF, where the search keys follow a uniform distribution, and (ii) SKW, where the keys are generated using ZIPF, with the skewness parameter set to 0.8 (i.e., so that 77% of the search keys are concentrated in 20% of the domain). We evaluate the performance of SAE and TOM for different dataset cardinalities (n). For each experiment, we perform 100 uniform queries with extent 0.5% of the entire domain, and present the average cost over all measurements. In TOM, the SP indexes records with an MBTree, while in SAE with a B + -Tree. The TE (in SAE) uses an XB-Tree. All indexes are disk-based using pages of 4096 bytes. When measuring processing cost, we charge 10 milliseconds for each node access. Figure 5 illustrates the communication overhead between the pair (TE, client) in SAE and (SP, client) in TOM. This overhead refers only to the authentication information and excludes the cost of transmitting the result. In SAE, the only authentication information exchanged is the VT, which is 20 bytes irrespectively of the cardinality of the result set. This overhead is negligible compared to the VO size in TOM, which is 2-3 orders of magnitude higher. Figure 6 depicts the query processing overhead (in milliseconds) versus n. For SAE, we include the costs at the SP (for computing the result) and the TE (for producing the VT). TOM involves a higher cost at the SP because of the lower fanout of the MB-Tree compared to the B + -Tree in SAE. In particular, SAE reduces the burden at the SP by 30%-39% in UNF, and 24%-37% in SKW. The computational effort at the TE is negligible because VT generation always involves two tree traversals. On the other hand, both the B + -Tree and the MB-Tree entail two additional scans; (i) at the leaf level of the index, and (ii) in the dataset file for retrieving the results. Figure 7 shows the verification cost as a function of the dataset cardinality. As n increases, more records satisfy the query, which has fixed extent. The verification cost is linearly dependent on the result size for both methods. In SAE the client has to compute a digest for each record received by the SP. In TOM, the client must also re-construct the root digest of the MB-Tree and verify it against the DO's signature. The verification times are lower for SKW, because the average result cardinality is smaller and, thus, the client computes fewer digests. Figure 8 evaluates SAE and TOM with respect to storage cost. Both methods require similar total space at the SP, because the consumption is dominated by the outsourced dataset (i.e., the additional authentication information is small compared to the actual records). Furthermore, recall that the TE maintains only the digest of each record. Therefore, its storage requirements are minor compared to that of the SP, implying that the TE can maintain a main memory index (instead of the disk-based XB-Tree). To conclude, in addition to its other benefits, SAE also outperforms TOM in every performance metric. The most significant savings refer to (i) the network overhead, where the VT is up to 3 orders of magnitude smaller than the average VO, and (ii) the computational burden at the SP, where SAE achieves reductions up to 39% of the total processing time. The above enable the client to experience a lower response time (i.e., interval between query transmission and result verification). Finally, our experiments show that the TE in SAE consumes negligible resources in comparison to the SP.
V. CONCLUSION
We propose SAE, a novel outsourcing model that separates authentication from query execution. SAE minimizes the participation of the DO in the authentication process, and eliminates the need of specialized infrastructure on behalf of the SP. Furthermore, it outperforms the conventional model on all metrics, achieving significant gains for the communication cost and processing effort at the SP, which constitute the most important factors.
